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(1) Did the court of special appeals
misapply Batson v. Kentucky to the
circumstances of this case?
(2) Can Gorman assert a sixth
amendment claim of fair cross-section deprivation in the composition
of his jury?
(3) Did the court of special appeals
err in mandating a new trial?
[d. at 413-14,554 A.2d at 1208.
Regarding the first question, the court
considered the applicability of Batson to
the facts before it. Batson, which involved the state exercising its peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
from the trial of a black man, created a
three-part evidentiary standard that a defendant must meet in order to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in petit jury selection: 1) defendant must establish that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group and that the
prosecution has used peremptory challenges to strike members of the same race
from venire; 2) the defendant may rely on
the fact that peremptory challenges permit discrimination by those who desire to
discriminate in their selection of a petit
jury; and 3) defendant must show that
these facts and any other circumstances
surrounding the jury selection raise an
inference that the state used their peremptory challenges to strike veniremen
from the petit jury because of their race.
[d. at 410, 554 A.2d at 1207 (relying on
Batson 476 U.S. at 96).
The Gorman court held that the court
of special appeals had misapplied the
Batson standard as that holding did not
include situations where the jurors
struck were not the same race as the
defendant. Gorman, 315 Md. at 414-16,
554 A.2d at 1208-10. Furthermore, the
circumstances in Gorman failed to meet
the first prong of the Batson evidentiary
standard. Gorman was not a member of
a cognizable racial group, nor were the
jurors who were struck the same race as
Gorman. [d. at 416, 554A.2d at 1209-10.
Next, the court rejected Gorman's contention that the state's exercise of peremptory challenges violated his constitutional right to due process of law. Although Gorman relied on Peters v. Ki/f,
407 U.S. 493 (1972) for support, the
court noted that Peters involved due
process because the jury had been illegally composed, not because of any misuse of peremptory challenges. Therefore, the court concluded that the state's
use of peremptory challenges in Gorman's case did not rise to the level of a
due process violation. Gorman, 315 Md.
at 417, 554A.2d at 1210.
Similarly, the court rejected Gorman's

sixth amendment claim of fair cross-section deprivation; first, because the Batson Court had ignored a similar claim;
and second, because the later case of
Lockbartv. McCree, 476U.S. 162 (1986)
expressly rejected the notion that the fair
cross-section guarantee of the sixth
amendment applied to peremptory
challenges. Gorman at 417-19,554 A.2d
at 1210-11.
Regarding the issue of whether the
lower court erred in mandating a new
trial, the court stated that the question
would only arise if in fact Batson applied
to the facts of Gorman's case. Since the
court previously determined that Batson
did not apply, it was not necessary to
consider the question. [d. at 420, 554
A.2d at 1211. Thus, the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the court of
special appeals, finding no constitutional violations from the state's exercise
of its peremptory challenges.
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Eldridge
opined that the actions of the state in this
case did constitute a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause, and therefore, required the prosecution to provide an explanation for its conduct. [d. at
420-23, 554 A.2d at 1212-13. He also
believed that both Gorman's fourteenth
amendment due process rights and his
sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury had been violated, that the "same
class" rule (the first step of the Batson
evidentiary test) was inconsistent with
equal protection ofthe law (as it applies
to race discrimination), and that Gorman
had standing to challenge the racial discrimination in the selection ofthe petit
jury in his case, based on the rationale of
Peters [d. at 423-38, 554A.2d at 1213-21.
In the dissent's view, the state's use of
peremptory challenges to strike persons
from a petit jury solely because of their
race should shift the evidentiary burden
to the state to prove othetwise. [d. at 438,
554 A.2d at 1220-21.
The Gorman decision is Significant as
it illustrates Maryland's refusal to extend
the holding of Batson beyond the specific factual scenario in Batson. The consequences are: 1) the unconditional
nature of the peremptory challenge as it
has historically existed is preserved; and
2) white criminal defendants in Maryland
are now precluded from asserting discrimination when the state uses its peremptory challenges to strike black veniremen. Conversely, the state remains
free to strike blacks from the jury panel in
any criminal trial where the defendant is
not black.
-Gregory}. Swain

Nelson v. State: TRlALJUDGE'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION IN A SERIOUS
NONCAPITAL CASE, IN TIlE
ABSENCE OF SOUND REASON, IS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 553
A.2d 667 (1989), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the trial court's refusal to order a presentence investigation report in a serious noncapital case,
without giving a sound reason why the
investigation should not be made, was an
abuse of discretion.
The defendant, Michael B. Nelson, was
convicted of first degree murder in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Following pronouncement of the verdict, Nelson requested that the court order a
presentence investigation under Md.
Ann. Code art, 41, §4-609 (1986 & Supp.
1988), before imposing sentence. Although the state had no objection to the
investigation, the sentencing judge refused. The court's reasoning was that
such investigations were costly and
would not be ordered without a showing
of particular need.
On the date of the dispoSition, Nelson
again requested a presentence investigation, arguing that, because the court has
the discretion to suspend any part of a life
sentence, the court was obligated to
learn as much as possible about the defendant in order to impose a fair sentence. The court again refused and imposed a life sentence and two consecutive one-year sentences. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland subsequently affirmed the judgments and
sentencing. The only issue before the
court of appeals was whether the trial
court erred in refusing to order a presentence investigation.
The court of appeals began its analysis
by turning to Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §4609(b) which requires agents of the Division of Parole and Probation to provide
the court with presentence reports or
other investigations in all cases when
requested by any judge. Section 4-609
(c)(l) provides:
Prior to the sentence by the circuit
court of any county to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction of
a defendant convicted of a felony, or
a misdemeanor which resulted in
serious physical injury or death to
the victim, or the referral of any
defendant to the Patuxent Institution, a presentence investigation
shall be completed by the Division
of Parole and Probation and considered by the court, unless the court
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specifically orders to the contrary in
a particular case.
Seeking to ascertain the legislative intent of section 4-609, the court made an
extensive review of the statute's legislative history. The court found that presentence investigations were first addressed
in 1953 Md. Laws, ch. 625, which provided that the Board of Parole and Probation would be available to the judges of
the circuit courts "for the purpose of
making presentence or other investigations" requested by the court.
In 1968, the statute was expanded to
include judges of any court of limited
criminal jurisdiction, "including, but not
limited to the Municipal Court of Baltimore City, any people's court or any trial
magistrate, . . . in all cases which may
include commitment for two or more
years .... "Md. Ann. Code art. 41 §124
(Supp. 1968). 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 532
made presentencing investigations available in cases where the commitment was
for less than two years, and present subsection (c) was added in 1976. In 1982,
misdemeanors were added to the list of
crimes entitling a defendant to an investigation and, in 1983, the investigation
was made mandatory in any case in which
the death penalty was requested. In
1987, the requirement for a presentencing report was further extended to
include cases where imprisonment for
life without a possibility of parole is requested.
Reading the plain language of section
4-609 in the context of the legislative history of the statute, the court of appeals
determined that the statute reflected an
obvious legislative preference for the use
of presentence investigation reports,
and determined that to overcome the
presumption in favor of these reports, a
court must have a valid reason, particular
to the facts of a given case, for refusing to
order an investigation. The court reiterated that a presentence report in capital
cases is mandatory. In all cases falling
within subsection (c) (1), the presentencing report also must be prepared
and considered, unless the court orders
to the contrary.
The court observed that a trial judge is
vested with broad discretionary powers,
including the power to fashion an appropriate sentence. The court noted however, that this discretion is limited. This
judicial discretion must be reflected in
the record, and it must not be arbitrary or
capricious, otherwise, the court's action
is erroneous. Nelson, 315 Md. at 70, 553
A.2d at 671.
In the case sub judice, the trial judge

refused to order an investigation, because: 1) there had been no showing that
there was anything pertaining to the defendant's background that the defense
lawyer himself could not have developed; and 2) the process was costly. The
court of appeals rejected both reasons.
In the court's view, placing the burden
on defense counsel to point out with
specificity, to the satisfaction of the
judge, that a presentence investigation
should be ordered was clearly contrary to
the statute. Under section 4-609 the
burden is on the judge to show why an investigation should not be conducted.
The trial judge's belief that the issue of
cost was relevant to ordering an investigation had no basis in either the language
or the history of the statute. Nelson, 315
Md. at 71-72,553 A.2d at 671-72.
According to the court of appeals, the
trial judge had required his own conditions to be met before a presentence
investigation would be ordered: an initial investigation by defense counsel, the
uncovering of a fact requiring additional
explanation, and a finding that the fact to
be explained was relevant to the imposition of a fair sentence. Thus, the trial
court's denial of the presentence investigation was an abuse of discretion. The
court of appeals reversed the judgment
of the court of special appeals to the
extent that the sentence imposed by the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City was affirmed, and remanded the case for resentencing with the benefit of a presentence
investigation report.
The decision inNelson is an attempt to
accommodate two significant interests:
the interest in fair sentencing based on
the best available information, and the
interest in historic deference to judicial
discretion. In holding that presentence
investigations in serious noncapital cases
are required, unless the judge provides
adequate reasons to support a denial, the
court severely restricted the trial judge's
discretionary power in this area.
-Suzanne R. Cohn
Texas v. Johnson: FlAG-BURNING
AS PROTEST PROTECTED
WITHIN CONTEXT OF FIRST
AMENDMENT
In Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. _ , 109
S. Ct. 2533 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that the conviction of a protestor for
burning an American flag as part of a
political demonstration violated the first
amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The Republican National Convention
was held in Dallas, Texas in 1984. A
political demonstration took place in the

city streets during the convention. The
demonstration was staged to protest the
policies of the Reagan Administration,
the nomination of President Reagan for
reelection and the activities of several
Dallas-based corporations. The protest
culminated at the Dallas City Hall where
Gregory Lee Johnson poured kerosene
on an American flag and set it ablaze.
Although the protestors chanted antiAmerican slogans over the burning flag,
they did not threaten or injure any bystanders.
Johnson was charged and convicted
under a Texas statute of desecrating a
venerated object. His conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District of Texas. However, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that johnson's actions
were the equivalent of symbolic speech
and were protected by the first amendment. The state argued that two separate
interests supported Johnson's conviction: "preserving the flag as a symbol of
national unity and preventing breaches
of the peace."Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537.
The court of criminal appeals rejected·
the state's arguments on both points. It
noted that although the Supreme Court
had not yet decided whether a state could
criminalize flag-burning to protect the
symbolic value of the flag, a government
could not impose upon its citizens beliefs
or messages associated with a symbol of
unity and that the first amendment protects differences of opinion with respect
to such symbols. [d. The Texas court also
believed thatJohnson's conduct did not
seriously threaten the status of the flag
nor did it lessen the flag's symbolic value.

[d.
Pertaining to the second interest, the
court of criminal appeals noted that the
desecration statute was not limited in
scope to punishing only those acts that
were likely to result in breaches of the
peace and also pointed out that
johnson's actions, while offensive to
most, were not likely to (and in fact did
not) cause a breach of the peace. Additionally, the court noted that Texas had
another statute that specifically addressed breaches of the peace, and if the
state was truly interested in punishing
Johnson for this reason it could have
done so without punishing him for flagburning. Since the court found the desecration statute to be unconstitutional as
applied, it did not reach the issue of
whether the statute was facially
unconstitutional. [d. at 2537-38.
The United States Supreme Court also
chose to resolve the case on an "as ap-
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